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REGULATORY MULTIPLICITIES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REFORMS IN INDONESIA AND CHINA* 
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I INTRODUCTION 
135 
Telecommunications is a key component in any country's economic infrastructure, 1 
requiring a vast amount of capital injection and ongoing technical innovation. For 
developing countries where capital availability and technical capability are limited, 
this handicap could retard the pace of industrialisation. 2 Therefore attracting both 
capital investments and technical expertise by attuning their economic policies and 
legal environment to meet investors' expectations is a priority. Even though 
privatisation had been triumph by international institutions like the World Bank as 
the linchpin for developing economies to industrialise, from a regulatory 
perspective this process is far from straightforward. Implementing economic 
policies requires a number of regulations and regulatory instruments to be in place. 
Apart from the need for an independent regulator, regulatory outcomes are often 
dependent on the willingness of various stakeholders' to comply with course of 
actions undertaken by authorities. 
Both Indonesia and China are large developing countries with a sizable population 
characterised by their embedded historical and cultural orientations. The lure of 
industrial country's living standards and impelled by postcolonial realities 
Indonesia embarked on economic modernisation in the late 1960s. 3 By the early 
1980s the government pursued a massive privatisation program in keeping with 
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worldwide trends. 4 This was remarkably complicated in part, because the number of 
infrastructure projects competing for resources. 5 On top, enmity amongst 
stakeholders along with the country's flatulent democracy obscured and delayed 
many key policy decisions. 6 
In comparison, China's 'Open Door Policy' since the late 1970s,7 establishing a 
unique economic framework steered by a Communist-led 'quasi-market economy' 
had produced remarkable economic outcomes. 8 The reforms have thus far produced 
far-reaching institutional and legal changes. 9 However, the Chinese government 
have a difficult task of controlling the pace and depth of change as there is some 
inherent political risks associated with rapid socio-economic transformation. 
Competing business and institutional interests striving for domination has strained 
both state/enterprise relations and state/social relations. More importantly, the 
reforms have exerted further demands to modernize the country's inept legal 
system. 10 
It is against these national attributes that this article examines the factors steering 
the process and changes in the telecommunications reforms. Whilst we contend that 
the political and socio-economic factors are too complex to analyse with sufficient 
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as identifying the multiplicities involve in regulating privatisation in both Indonesia 
and China against a 'model' proposed by the World Bank. 
II CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN REFORMING TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
Many economists champion privatisation as the 'answer' to advance developing 
countries' economic needs. 11 Even if the arguments in favour of privatisation are 
diametrically opposite to the case against, it remains on many country's economic 
reform agendas. 12 In essence, this reform presumes to boost foreign investors' 
confidence, 13 stimulate economic growth flowing from greater efficiency and 
competitive environment. 14 Furthermore privatisation is assumed to remove 
unwarranted political intervention. 15 Yet some post-privatised enterprises in the 
developed world have turned into private monopolies, riddled by inefficiencies and 
anti-competitive behaviours prompting re-regulation and selective political 
intervention. 16 
The 'know how' and 'model' ofprivatisation is often developed and recommended 
by international economic institutions like the World Bank staffed by technocrats 
and experts. It is not implausible to assert that these benchmarks are at times more 
influential than nationally developed models simply because it advances the 
international financial community's interests. As such developing economies are 
obliged to integrate these international models or benchmarks into domestic policies 
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In 1992 the World Bank (WB) produced a discussion paper on telecommunications 
reform framework as a 'template' for the WB to advice national governments on the 
economic benefits, as well as to develop regulatory strategies about privatisation. 18 
The paper notes while the nationalisation of telecommunications sector in 
developing economies in the 1960s had contributed to their development, by the 
1980s this policy produced bottlenecks in investments and caused inefficiencies. 19 
The course of action to remedy the above includes: 
1. separating operations from government activities; 
2. restructure the operations as an independent state enterprise charged 
with being financially self-sufficient; 
3. reorganise as a joint stock company; 
4. managed the entity as a business; 
5. controlling interest should devolved with employee stock ownership, 
trenching of stock sales, and residual state ownership; and 
6. carrying out of sale to the private sector. 20 
As well notes, 
Successful privatization of a state telecommunications enterprise depends on a 
number of factors falling into place. Privatization must be inserted in the political 
process. . . . Privatization also requires creating a market structure and regulatory 
environment that provide the new owners incentives and obligations to invest and 
perform, and institutional arrangement free the operators from unwarranted controls 
yet safeguard users and reconcile commercial interests with broader development 
objectives .... International market considerations are also increasingly important. ... 
Proper design and implementation of the complex process of privatization and related 
sector reforms requires strong and visible high-level political commitment, clear 
allocation of authority and resources to mange the process, and the expert assistance 
(including foreign) on policy, regulatory, legal and financial matters. 21 





The single most troubling issue in recent reforms is slow progress in developing 
regulatory capabilities. All major reforms have been based on the expectations that 
effective public regulation of privati sed monopolies, especially with respect to prices, 
service obligations, interconnection, competitive behavior, and access to the public 
domain (including use of radio spectrum), can be developed fairly quickly .... The 
search for better regulatory solutions merits high priority in the design of sector 
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reform .... An important issue is that of location and independence of the regulatory 
function. Regulation involves technical matters as well as rent distribution. An 
effective regulator must mediate among competing interests seeking to appropriate 
rents and understand how this affects sector performance. 22 
Grasping the contents of this report appears to be straightforward, almost to the 
extent that governments 'just need to follow the step-by-step instructions' and the 
anticipated benefits would ensue. But upon closer scrutiny many recommendations 
are driven by economic theoretical assumptions or anecdotal evidence of certain 
countries' positive experiences. 23 The entire process seemed to be reduced into a 
two-dimensional exercise with little tolerance for deviation or national attributes, 
despite the mild language in its text. The report also suggests a lack of political will 
or benevolent regulator as a failure. This blinked approach assumed that all national 
characteristics and problems are identical. 24 
For the sake of argument, even if the consequences of developing countries defying 
or disregarding WB recommendations are not necessarily catastrophe, often they 
are not in the position to ignore the significance of these recommendations. 
Research conducted by Li and Xu found that the impact of privatisation around the 
world revealed only fully privatised entities showed improvement in competition 
and positive returns in capital investments, whereas partial privatisation did not 
deliver much gains. 25 Hence in light of this evidence, developing countries would 
be more compelled to adopt WB recommendations. A World Bank study found that 
telecommunications sector in Asia generally requires substantial capital and 
technical investments to sustain the region's continued economic development. 26 
Governments in Asia would thus have to pursue policies that promote competition, 
increase private sector participation, and regulatory reforms expediting privatisation 
so as to stimulate economic growth. 27 Be that as it may, regulation is not a clear-cut 
affair simply be enacting necessary legislations to meet privatisation objectives. 
Regulation is often thought to be a government imposition that restricts and 
prevents certain undesirable behaviour. Rather it can also be understood as enabling 
and facilitative tool. 28 From an economic perspective, government's involvement in 
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failure. 29 Loss making, inefficient and uncompetJtJve state owned monopolies 
clearly falls into this category. 30 A commonsensical solution would be to rid the 
government of this responsibility to allow these entities to market forces. 31 Laws, 
regulations and polices would thus serve to enable and facilitate this transition by 
encouraging private ownership and investments, introduce corporate styled 
management, enact pro-competition laws, attune regulators and regulatory 
institutions to allow the market take its course devoid of governmental intervention, 
except to secure private property rights and uphold the privity of private 
transactions. 32 But economic regulations are not always consistent or manageable 
by the courts or authorities. Often authorities and the courts find enforcing 
economics type regulation difficult, as economic activities are not always easy to 
define within legal doctrines. 33 
Regulating privatisation does not stop at allowing private sector to parttctpate, 
separation of state's ownership functions with operation matters, implementing 
competition policies and removing legal barriers for new entrants, and establishing 
an independent regulator. 34 According to the OECD Guidelines on the Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) released on 28 April 2005, the 
challenge facing SOEs including the telecommunications sector is that these entities 
have conflicting corporate objectives, unclear board responsibilities, opaque board 
appointments, and a lack of equitable treatment towards shareholders. 35 All of 
which would require 'self-regulation', where the regulator encourages internal 
regulation of the SOE through its own procedures. 36 This is where the corporate 
governance, especially at the board level becomes crucial. 37 An effective board 
would have a clear mandate and objectives responsible for the entities performance. 
Members should be appointed on the basis of merit and not favour. 38 In short, the 
governance of a privatised entity should operate on competitive market 
expectations. However the trade-off matrix would most likely be socio-political 
agendas. 
Telecommunications reforms in Indonesia have so far demonstrated a clear 
commitment towards a competitive market structure, at least in theory. 39 With the 
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aftennath of 1997 financial crisis which created greater economic inequalities pose 
a considerable challenge for the newly elected government to govern. The 
combination of international pressure, domestic economic needs, and political 
concerns add to the complexities in the fonnulation of policies. 40 As a result, 
international investors have become more cautious. The newly elected democratic 
government not only has to rejuvenate the economy, but also reassure international 
investors its ability to provide greater political stability. At this stage, it is relatively 
uncertain as to the extent this government could govern without further domestic 
unrest. Plainly appeasing the vested interests of various politically and 
economically influential stakeholders are crucial. According to Mardjana, 'The 
future evolution and configuration of Indonesia's public sector enterprises thus 
remain uncertain, subject both to economic trends and to the outcome of continuing 
policy debates within the government'. 41 In view of this, it would be doubtful that 
Indonesia could implement WB's recommendations beyond weak regulations. 
China is a different 'kettle of fish', in tenns of economic development and domestic 
political affairs. Since China has been left relatively unscathed by the Asian 
financial crisis, in conjunction with recent smooth political leadership transition, 
market liberalisation has continued to gain momentum. 42 Even though China's 
accession to WTO obliged the government to meet its obligations under the treaty, 
the country's privatisation still bears distinct Chinese characteristics. 43 Moreover 
recent intensity in domestic competition has driven business rivals to resort to 
aggressive tactics causing some concerns to the central Beijing government. The 
government has to work on two fronts; first, showing the international community 
they are committed to further liberalisation, and second endeavour to retain some 
levels of control between competing interests of various governmental institutions 
and anxious entrepreneurs. 44 Thus it appears that the economic refonns would 
continue with Chinese characteristics dominated by domestic interests, at the same 
time, authorities would continue to appease its international obligations. 
III TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REFORMS IN INDONESIA 
A The Beginnings: Ample Room, Too Few Players 
In keeping with practices in most countries, the Government of the Republic of 
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was considered to be strategically vital to national security for many decades. 45 As 
early as 1961, Indonesia's first telecommunications SOE PN Postel had had the 
privilege of being the only SOE providing domestic and international 
telecommunications services immune from market competition. After two decades, 
GOI nationalised a previously foreign investment company to establish a new SOE, 
PT Indonesian Satellite Corporation (lndosat). Right from its induction, Indosat had 
been granted exclusive rights to provide international telecommunications services, 
while PN Postel was restructured to become Perusahaan Umum Telekomuniasi 
(Perumtel), granted monopoly rights to provide local and long distance domestic 
services. 46 Subsidies and protection had however undermined efficiency and 
profitability. Perumtel and Indosat also followed similar faith due in part to a lack 
of efficiency. This led to the endorsement of Presidential Instruction No 5 in 1988 
and the Ministry of Finance decrees No 740 and 741 in 1989, which was expected 
to turn things around. 47 
The GOI also introduced Law No 311989 specifically designed to increase 
productivity in the telecommunications sector. 48 Concurrent arrangements were in 
place to change Perumtel 's status to a limited liability company, as well as law 
regulating the involvement of private companies under specific cooperative 
schemes. 49 Perumtel was transformed to a state owned limited liability company PT 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Telkom) in 1991 with Government Regulation No 
2511991. Further 'quasi-competition' was introduced with the establishment of 
SOE-private party cooperation schemes. 50 The cooperation schemes endeavoured to 
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including foreign capital investments in this sector. 51 Early steps of Indonesian 
telecommunications sector restructuring had then enhanced further by privatising 
Indosat and Telkom in 1994 and 1995 respectively through Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) on both domestic and international exchanges. 52 Yet Indonesian 
telecommunications service market was still dominated by duopoly of Telkom and 
Indosat. Moreover both providers were able to maintain their dominant position by 
entering into joint ownership arrangements with most subsidiaries. 53 An overview 
of the Indonesian telecommunications industry following the introduction of Law 
No 3/1989 is in Table 1.1. 
By the end of 1992, Indonesia which was then constituted the world's fifth most 
populous country with its about 190 million people was served by just 1.5 million 
connected telephone lines, representing teledensity (the number of main telephone 
lines per 100 inhabitants) of only 0.8. 54 With such a low teledensity, it was not 
surprising that Indonesia's teledensity was among the lowest in the Asian region. 
Access divide was apparent with around 45 percent of the lines were concentrated 






For example, since 1995 Telkom has made private arrangements with investors to enter into 
partnership schemes through two specific alternatives of agreement. These are revenue sharing 
agreements (PBH) or joint operation agreements (KSO). PBH generally allows investors to 
finance and construct a given project and leaves its operation including all operating costs to 
Telkom while revenues are shared between Telkom and the investor. In this scheme of co-
operation, legal ownership of the constructed remains with the investor until expiration of the 
PBH agreement whereupon transferred to Telkom. With KSO agreements however, the private 
investor acts only as the operator of any specified Division, ie, regional service allocation, on 
behalf of Telkom. The KSO Agreements provided those private sector consortia, each of 
which involved one or more prominent international telecommunications operators, to manage 
and operate regional divisions for a fixed term, undertake the construction of fixed lines and at 
the end of the term, transfer existing and new telecommunications facilities to Telkom for 
agreed amount of compensation in addition to share revenue generated during the term of 
agreement. There were seven regional divisions and one network division, which five of them 
were used to be served by the KSO agreements. See PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Tbk 
(Telkom) 2003 Annual Report- Form 20F (2004) 4A. 
Telkom's IPO was completed on November 14, 1995. Since then, its shares have been listed 
on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSX) and London Stock 
Exchange (LSX). Apart from the listing arrangements, Telkom's shares were also offered on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange as public offering without listing (POWL). Similarly, Indosat was 
listed on the Jakarta, Surabaya and New York Stock Exchanges in October 1994. See Telkom, 
2003 Annual Report (2004) 2;Indosat, 2004 Annual Report (2005). 
Telkom, above n 52. 
John Ure, Telecommunication in Asia (1995) 50. 
Ibid. 
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Table 1.1 Structure of the Indonesian Telecommunications industry ex-ante 
the 1999 reform 
Telecommunications services Telecommunications operations 
Basic Telecommunications 
Fixed wireline local services Exclusive rights 1996-20 I 0 (Telkom) 
Fixed wireless local services Limited competition (Sate! indo) 
Fixed domestic long-distance service Exclusive right 1996-2005 (Telkom) 
Fixed international service Duopoly 1995-2004 (lndosat, Sate Iindo) 
Mobile cellular service Competition based on frequency availability 
Non-basic Telecommunications Competition exists 
Customer Premise Equipments (CPE) Competition exists 
Source: Department of Transport and Commumcatwns (1999) 
B Recent Developments: Too Many Regulations, Too Little Impact 
A major contributor to market liberalization and competition is this sector was 
Indonesia's commitments under GATT/WT0. 56 The financial crisis in 1997 had 
negatively impacted on the country's telecommunications industry. 57 The 
unprecedented depreciation of the currency left many telephone users unable to pay 
their telephone bills. 58 The situation had also caused operators and their private 
partners (KSO) to experience difficulties in fulfilling their obligations, some of 
which led to protracted legal disputes. In order to reduce the severity of the impacts, 
the GOI approached the International Monetary Fund (IMP) for assistance. 59 
Some steps toward further market liberalization in the telecommunications industry 
had been acted upon. These include restructuring some regulations which probably 





For example, Indonesia had submitted supplementary schedules of commitments which 
include among other things deletion of economic needs test for new entrants in domestic 
mobile cellular telephone services, personal mobile cellular communication services and 
regional and national paging services. Schedules for termination of extended exclusive rights 
have also been forwarded. Thus exclusivity for Telkom in providing domestic long-distance 
fixed line services is set to expire in 2005, in 2010 for Telkom's local service and in 2004 for 
Indosat and Satelindo's international service. Subject to the use of networks of Indosat and 
Satelindo for international traffic, Indonesia is also committed to competitive supply 
mechanism for packed switched public data network services, telex, telegraph and internet 
access services. See Trade Policy Review-Indonesia, WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/117 (2003) 92. 
There has been extensive analysis on the causes and consequences of Indonesia's financial 
crisis. See eg, Ross H McLeod 'Indonesia: Macroeconomic Fundamentals in the Lead-up to 
the Crisis' in R H McLeod and R Garnaut (eds), East Asia in Crisis: From being a Miracle to 
Needing one? (2000) 31, 31-48; Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis (1999). 
Republic of Indonesia, above n 50, IV.4. A sudden depreciation of Indonesian Rupiah (Rp) 
towards US$ from 2,430 to 3,600 marked Indonesia's early phase of financial crisis. 
Subsequently Rp was further depreciated into Rp 6,000 per US$ and reached its lowest ebb of 
Rp17,000 within six months after the crisis first broke out. It has currently been relatively 
steady at the range ofRp 7,500/US$. 
The GOI entered into an agreement with the IMF in late October 1997. The first financial 
assistance package provided by the IMF brought about US$! 0 billion from IMF and US$8 
billion from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) combined. See McLeod, 
above n 57, 40-42. 
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establishing telecommunications independent regulatory body and a clearing house 
for traffic and interconnection, further stipulating tariff rebalancing, fixed wireless 
access, granting 3G (third generation) licenses and launching universal service 
obligation (USO) program. 60 
Since 1997 Telecommunications Law No 36/1999 and the 1999 Blueprint became 
the government's primary telecommunications platform.61 The Telecommunications 
Law provides key guidelines for industry reforms including industry liberalization 
and the facilitation of new entrants. 62 The Blueprint on the other hand depicts the 
profiles of future Indonesia telecommunications sector and ensuring that sound 
competition, effective regulatory regime, accessible telecommunications services 
and quality services are in place. 63 In addition, new categorization of 
telecommunications operators (service and network providers),64 elimination of 
restrictions towards private players, 65 commercial assessments in the formation of 
cooperation schemes, 66 greater foreign share ownership, cost-oriented 
Telecommunications service tariff, and terrestrial-satellite infrastructure for 
multimedia communication had also been introduced. 67 
Pursuant to the new Telecommunications Law, the GOI, Telkom and Indosat 
entered into an agreement on 28 July 2000 to expedite early termination of both 
operators' exclusive rights. Instead of retaining exclusive rights on local 
Telecommunications fixed network and service operator up to year 2010, Telkom's 
exclusive rights were terminated on 1 August 2002. Rights to provide long distance 
services until 2005 were also terminated sooner starting from 1 August 2003; 
likewise, Indosat agreed to release its exclusive rights as monopolistic international 
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Operator, ie, Telkom or Indosat in providing basic telecommunication services: Republic of 
Indonesia, above n 50, III.2. 
Government Regulation No 8/1993 and Decree of the Communications Minister No 39/1993 
as the implementing regulations of Law No 3/1989 on Telecommunication allow only joint 
ventures, joint operations and management contracts as alternatives for cooperation with 
private entities (Other Entities). Government Regulation No 52 and 53/2003 however allow 
greater flexibility in such cooperation schemes: ibid. 
Ibid. 
As part of the exclusive rights early termination schemes of both Telkom and Indosat, GOI 
through its Ministry of Communications issued on 30 March 2004 an announcement No 
PM.2/2004, concerning the implementation of telecommunication restructuring. With its 
issuance, the GOI among other things has agreed to pay Telkom including its KSO partners an 
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ownership between the two operators was removed as of August 2001, Telkom and 
Indosat were engaged in competition essentially creating a duopolistic market 
structure in the fixed line market segment and leave other segments particularly 
mobile phone towards greater competition. 
At the implementation level, the Law No 36/1999 itself opens up room for 
extensive regulations. 69 In an attempt to completely finish the reform agenda, the 
GOI announced various implementing regulations since the Law's enforcement in 
2000, 70 famously known as the March 2004 Telecommunications package. 
Consisting of eight decrees by the Ministry of Communications, the package has 
two distinctive categories. One category is to regulate certain contentious affairs 
that so far have been left unregulated, 71 while the other is amending existing 
regulations and aims to fully implement the Telecommunications Law and the 
Blueprint. 72 
There are other legal and regulatory forces playing apart in ongoing legal and 





amount of Rp 478 billion after tax and lndosat to pay the Government an amount of Rp 178 
billion after tax. The payment of compensation to Telkom is to be made from the 'on top' 
(above allocated ceiling) fund of the State Budget for the Ministry of Communications after 
approval by the Parliament. In addition to this early termination arrangement, the 
announcement also sets down other matters such as the need to release supporting regulations 
in order to settle interconnection problems and to amend current regulations, which turned out 
hampering full competition between Telkom and Indosat. The announcement also touches 
issues with regard to the newly established Indonesian Telecommunication Regulatory Body 
(BRTI) and the Telecommunications Traffic Clearance System (SKTT), tariff rebalancing, 
universal service obligations, fixed wireless and license synchronization for Telkom and 
Indosat. See Telkom, 'The Implementation of the Telecommunication Sector Restructuring' 
(Press Release No Tel 157/PROOO/UHI/2004, 31 March 2004). See also Bringing competition 
into regulated sectors: Indonesian experience in preparing framework for competition in the 
telecommunication sector, OECD Doc DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2005)5 (2005) (Contribution 
from Indonesia 12 Jan 2005). 
The Law, for example has called for at least 19 government regulations in its text although it is 
worth noted that one government regulation may cover one or more issues at the same time 
which would eventually reduce the number of implementing government regulations. 
See eg Government Regulation No 52/2000 concerning service provisions, which stipulates 
the categorization of telecommunication operators as network, service and specific-purposes 
telecommunication operator, and Government Regulation No 53/2000 which stipulates the use 
of radio frequency spectrums and satellite orbits. Further down the implementing regulations 
lie many Ministerial Decrees including a Decree by the Ministry of Communications No KM 
21/2000 on Telecommunication Service Operations, listing all other valid Ministerial Decrees. 
Including in this category are regulations on interconnection tariff (No 32/2004), enforcing 
competition on the operations of fixed network and basic telephony services (No 33/2004), 
universal service obligations (No 34/2004) and the operations of fixed local wireless (No 
35/2004). 
Falling under this category are provisions of national telecommunication fundamental 
technical plan (No 28/2004, amending Ministerial Decree No 4/2001), of telecommunication 
network operations (No 34/2004, amending Ministerial Decree No 20/200 I), of 
telecommunication service operations (No 30/2004), amending Ministerial Decree No 
21/2000) and of public telephony internet service operations (No 31/2004, amending 
Ministerial Decree No 23/2002). 
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No 5/1999, the Consumer Protection Law No 8/1999, and SOEs Law No 19/2003. 
In addition, Indonesia has been promoting decentralization since 2000, under Law 
No 22/1999 which the government to delegate certain authorities to regional or 
district councils, overtime would influence overall regulatory distribution of power. 
Compounding to this, Law No 7/1984, an accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) also shapes any strategic policy decisions. 73 
C Current Structure: The Divide Remains 
As of June 2004, Indonesia has seen an increasing number of both teledensity and 
telecommunications carriers. 74 Telkom however still constitutes dominant operator 
with more than 98 percent of market share in the fixed-line service. For mobile 
telephone market, three major national operators dominated 98 percent of market 
share. 75 In the long-distance market, Telkom serves as major player with Indosat 
just entering the market. There are currently seven licenses for Voice over IP 
(VOIP) operators and 20 for operators of broadband wireless access using 2.5G, 
3.3G, 5.6G, 5.7G, and 10.5G bands. As for fixed line, the duopoly of Telkom and 
Indo sat remains. 76 
The liberalization has so far provided equal access to the privileges, those who live 
in the capital city or other big cities which are to less than half of Indonesian 66,778 
villages. 77 As of June 2004, 43,022 villages have no access to telephony and it is for 







With reference to telecommunications, Indonesia's commitments cover among other things, 
exclusive rights on telecommunication service providers, percentage on foreign participation 
and other things as set out therein the WTO Reference Paper, which include provisions related 
to transparency, competition, interconnections and an independent regulatory body. See Giri 
Suseno, 'Siaran Pers Mastel' (Press Release, 7 July 2003). 
In 2003, there were 8.5 million fixed lines in service with teledensity of 3.54%. As of 2004, 
there were a total of 8. 7 million fixed lines and 22.7 million cellular subscribers, increasing the 
teledensity to -15%. As of March 2002, there are 12 telecommunications carriers in 
Indonesian. See State Ministry for National Development Planning/National Development 
Planning Agency, 'Infrastructure Road Map' (paper presented at the Infrastructure Summit 
2005, Jakarta, I7-I8 January 2005) 49; 'ICT market penetration still low', The Jakarta Post 
(Jakarta), 21 March 2005, 3; Asian Info-Communications Council, Country Status Report: 
Indonesia (2003) <http://www.aic.or.jp> at 21 March 2005. 
In the mobile market segment Telkom through its subsidiary Telkomsel (Telkom cellular) 
nonetheless catches the biggest portion (58%). The other two carriers are Indosat-Satelindo 
and Excelcomindo which compete for the remaining major share. See Asmiati Rasyid 
'Duopoli Perlu Diterminasi Secepatnya' Kompas (Jakarta) 16 September 2004; Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN), The Indonesian telecom industry at a 
crossroad (2000) <http://www .indotradezone.com/lnformasi/Telecom.html> at 2 March 2005. 
The data are based on the GOI submission into the 30'h meeting APEC Telecommunication 
and Information Working Group, 19-24 September 2004. See APEC, Telwg30/PLEN/21: 
Indonesia's Regulatory Update (2004) <http://wwwapectelwg.org> at 6 March 2005. 
As of June 2004, the capital city of Jakarta for example has teledensity of 25 while other big 
cities are ranging from II to 20. On the contrary, rural areas have teledensity as low as 0.2: 
ibid. See also State Ministry for National Development Planning/National Development 
Planning Agency, above n 74, 49. 
Article 16 of Law No. 3611999 on Telecommunications. 
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program aims to enhance telephony access to information access, develop 
information access as a fundamental for information society, and being local 
economy catalyst. 79 Thus in short term, the main USO goal is to provide telephony 
access for those >43,000 rural villages, while endeavours to attain the medium and 
long-term goals of better quality access and service provisions to all and community 
access to information. 80 
An overview of the Indonesian telecommunications structure following the 
introduction of the 1999 Law is provided in the following Table 1.2. 
79 
80 
Table 1.2 Structure of the Indonesian Telecommunications industry ex-post 
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D The Regulator: Business as Usual 
Prior to the establishment of Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory Body 
(BRTI) on 11 July 2003, Indonesian telecommunications industry was governed by 
the Directorate General of Post and Telecommunications (DGPT), which was 
operating under the auspices of the Department of Communications. Since BRTI's 
induction the structure of Indonesian regulatory authority has been changed. Altered 
to become an independent regulatory body under the Minister of Communications 
decree No 31/2003,81 the BRTI comprise ofthe DGPT and the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Committee (the Committee). 82 The establishment of this body was 
driven in part by Indonesia's obligations under GATT and later WTOY 
One of the BRTI's main functions is to ensure transparent, independent, and 
competitive Telecommunications market. In order to ensure transparency, a system 
for handling all interconnection matters named Telecommunications Traffic 
Clearing System (SKTT) has been established. 84 Consequently the regulatory, 
supervisory, and controlling functions were transferred from the Minister to the 
BRTI, consisting of five members with the director general of the post and 
telecommunications acting as the chairman of the Committee. 85 The members were 
installed on 19 December 2003 and have commenced their duties since January 
2004. The existence oflndonesian BRTI appears to conform to global practices and 
is yet riddled with controversies. 86 On the one hand, BRTI represents Indonesia's 








The decree serves as an implementing regulation towards the main Telecommunications Law 
No 3611999. Specifically, the establishment of BRTI was a conditional requirement set by the 
House of Representative Commission IV in allowing the GO! to raise telephone rates. See Eva 
C Komandjaja, 'Mastel Suggests Restructuring of BRTI' The Jakarta Post (Jakarta) 4 
December 2003. 
Telkom, above n 51, 3. 
For details see WTO/GATS special session on telecommunications services of 25 June 1999. 
Also the current draft of schedule has detailed Indonesia's up-to-date specific commitments of 
telecommunications services with regards to limitations on market access and on national 
treatment including its additional commitments within the 4 modes of supply: cross-border 
supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural person. Indonesia: 
Draft Consolidated Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO Doc S/DCS/W/IDN (24 January 
2003) accessible online through http://docsonline.wto.org. 
Through this system, the regulatory body expects to obtain accurate data on the profile of 
interconnection traffics among operators which can then be used to calculate traffic congestion 
so as to ensure transparency in charging fees: ibid. 
Appointment and disposal of committee members remain an exclusive right of the Minister. 
Members are having a two-year service period with a possibility of re-appointment for a 
maximum one service period. The Committee is to report to the incumbent Minister each 
quarterly or in such other times as deem necessary and any BRTI's decision represents and 
takes the form of a director general decree. See articles 8-9, 11-12 of the Ministerial Decree 
No 3112003. 
ITU Trends in Telecommunications Reform 2002: Effective Regulation (41h ed, 2002). 
Article 5 of the WTO Reference Paper has recommended the establishment of a regulatory 
body which is separate from, and not accountable to any suppliers of basic telecommunications 
services and of which decisions of and the procedures used are impartial with respect to all 
market participants. 
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hand, the operations of BRTI had showed inconsistencies and deviations from 
international practices. 
The problem lies with its independency although the Ministerial Decree No 31/2003 
has made it clear that independency is one of its three main characteristics, along 
with transparency and fairness. Issues of independency are apparent by the presence 
of the director general of post and telecommunications as chairman of the 
Committee and the absence of telecommunications association representatives in its 
membership. 88 Given a position as the chairman, the director general could 
influence decision making in the BRTI because even though the Committee has the 
authorities to make decisions either through consensus or voting, final decisions 
require approval from the director general. 89 Things get more complicated in the 
case of Telkom where GOI is the majority shareholder. In this particular 
circumstance, the structure of BR TI indicates that the GOI has failed to draw a line 
separating its functions as the regulator and as an industry player. Considering 
administrative position that the director general holds, it is very unlikely that BRTI 
would be able to make independent judgments free from the government's 
interference as logically assessments will benefit Telkom in which the GOI is the 
majority shareholder. The protracted conundrums on long distance code access 
might well illustrate this point. Enabled with end-to-end national network coverage, 
the incumbent Telkom has been largely benefited by being able to supply 
international direct dialing service since 7 June 2004. Yet Indosat's ability to do so 
in the domestic long distance segment has to be imperceptibly deferred for as long 
as another five years. The is due to the unprecedented judicial review suit filing to 
the Constitutional Court just few days prior to Indosat's long-distance access 
scheduled to activate on 1 April 2005.90 This strategy has been considered as anti-
competitive and breaches policies stipulated in the article ( 1) 0 of the Ministerial 
Decree No 28/2004. 91 
E Post Privatisation Syndrome: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? 
The emergence of the first wave of Indonesian SOE privatisation program came 
about as early as 1988.92 Privatisation was initiated along with the deregulation in 
the banking sector. 93 By the end of 1993, privatisation initiatives across different 







See article 11 of Ministerial Decree No. KM3 1/2003. See also article 5 of Law No. 36/1999. 
Komandjaja, above n 81. 
The Ministerial Decrees being filed for judicial reviews are those of No. 28/2004, 29/2004 and 
of No 30/2004. These three Decrees provide a basis for long distance code access 
transfiguration as stipulated by the Ministerial Decree No 4/2004 of 13 May 2004. 
J B Basuki, 'Kebijakan SLI PT Telkom: Normally and Illegally Closed' Kompas (Jakarta) 2 
August 2004. Telkom's anti-competition conducts have been largely indicated, such as 
obstructions toward lndosat's 001 and 008 code access in several occasions which led to 
investigation by the Indonesian Competition Watch (KPPU). 
Muhamad Suhud, 'Privatization: A Review on the Power Sector Restructuring in Indonesia' 
(2002) INFID <http://www.infid.or.id> 16 March 2005. 
Ibid. 
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international' by listing its shares overseas and domestically, followed by Telkom a 
year later. 94 
The exercise served more than just 'ownership transfer from government to 
private'. 95 There was an expectation of improving efficiency, providing positive 
contribution to the national budget and job opportunities while at the same time 
lessen the burden of public administration. 96 In the aftermath of the financial crisis 
however, the main objective of the second privatisation wave has been alleviation 
of the government's budgetary deficit. 97 More importantly, it served as a key 
structural adjustment strategy recommended by the IMF and supported by the 
World Bank and ADB. 98 It functioned as 'conditionality' to obtain support, mostly 
foreign loans from these institutions and other donor groups. Until the end of the 
term of the agreement with IMF in 2003, the effectiveness of the assisted 
privatisation programs has been questioned. 99 
Under tremendous pressure from the IMF, Indonesia had to act quickly to privatise 
its SOEs. Thus target to privatise 150 SOEs within the timeframe of 1998-2008, 
bypassing many processes, in many cases the privatisation took place before 
internal restructuring carried out, setting of performance criteria, or had in place 








Ure and Vivorakij maintained that development in the case of telecommunications has double 
meanings: efforts to bring telecommunication within reasonable access to people and attempts 
to modernize the economy through information technology. See J Ure and A Vivorakij in D J 
Ryan Privatization and Competition in Telecommunication (1997) 7-11. 
See eg Ure and Vivorakij, ibid. See Nugraha, above n 47, 14-15. Ure and Vivorakij warned 
however that a more exacting definition would require such a transfer to give sufficiently the 
private operators substantive independent power. The ambiguity of the term was well 
illustrated by Nugraha when he exemplified many and often contradictory meanings of 
privatization from political-philosophical, ideology, economic and legal points of view. 
Suhud above n 92. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. The agreement between GOI and the IMF was manifested in the Letter of Intent (Lol) 
and Structural Adjustment Program. The IMF-led Indonesian reform programs are based on 
the presumption that the economic difficulties stem largely from structural distortions. Thus 
any reform program will not be effective in restoring macroeconomic stability unless these 
distortions are addressed sufficiently. See David C L Nellor 'The Role of the International 
Monetary Fund' in R H McLeod and R Garnaut (eds), above n 57, 245, 258-259. 
In Indonesia, the opposition towards IMF policies is articulated by a group of 35 leading 
economists under 'Indonesia Bangkit' who campaigned strongly to end Indonesia's assistance 
programs with the IMF. See M Chatib Basri, 'Economic Update 2003: After Five Years of 
Reformasi Ekonomi, What Next?' in M C Basri and Pierre van der Eng (eds), Business in 
Indonesia (2004) 39, 50. For others, see eg, McLeod above n 57, 45-47, Hill, above n 57, 78-
80. 
There is an imminent danger in pursuing a reform agenda where privatization is placed before 
separate, independent regulatory authorities are put in place. In his study involving 200 
countries in 1985-1999, Wallsten found that having privatization programs done before the 
establishment of sound and effective regulatory authorities impair telecommunications 
investment and telephone penetration. Moreover, he also found that investors require a risk 
premium to invest in countries where regulatory authorities remain unclear. Scott Wallsten 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2817 (April 2002) 1-15. 
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In doing so Indonesia preferred public offerings and private sales to other methods 
of privatisation such as management buy-out and concessions. 101 The set targets and 
limited time frameworks had also left the GOI with little flexibility in exercising 
other alternatives of SOE restructuring programs. There was also a lack of 
preparatory studies carried out 102 Another issue is the existence of golden share 
arrangements. 
Nationalism is endemic to Indonesia's territorial integrity. 103 In order to safeguard 
the national interests, a 'protection mechanism' was introduced by the GOI, known 
as the 'golden share arrangements'. 104 Based on legal requirements of share 
ownership and corporate control, golden share arrangements find its justification on 
Article 46( 4) of Indonesian basic company law No 1/1995, which classifies golden 
shares as a priority shares and allow corporate control to remain in government 
hands. 105 With the GOI holding an aggregate interest of approximately 51.19 






With management buy-out, the management is given the opportunity to control the company's 
assets. Concession arrangements on the other hand include joint operations wherein the private 
sector is given a work contract to take over an SOE in stages. See Suhud above n 92. 
The Union Network International (UN!) Telecoms has indicated that the continual stream of 
privatization initiatives have not been to the advantage of workers and consumers. The absence 
of studies on Indonesian telecommunications privatization programs has therefore urgently 
poses the need to conduct further research whether or not social benefits have been increased 
by recent privatization programs of telecommunications SOEs. See UN! Telecoms 'Regulation 
and Sustainable Telecommunication Industry' (2004) United Network International 
<http://www.union-network.org> 15 March 2005. 
Nugraha, above n 47, 226. 
Golden share clauses can be found in almost articles of association of the privatized SOEs, 
including those of Telkom and Indosat (telecommunication), Bank BNI, Semen Gresik 
(cement manufacturer), Timah and Aneka Tambang (mining companies). See Nugraha, above 
n 47, 224. The adoption of golden share mechanism has also been popular and implemented in 
for example Portugal (Law No ll/1990), France (Decree No. 93-1298 of 13 December 1993 
concerning Societe Nationale Elf-Aquitaine), Belgium (Belgian Royal Decree of 19 June 1994 
concerning Societe de distribution du gaz SA), Spain (Law No 5/1995 and implementing 
decrees creating special powers in respect of Repsol SA, Telef6nica de Espana SA, Tabacalera 
SA and Endesa), Italy (special Italian Government's powers retained in EN! SpA and Telecom 
Italia SpA), United Kingdom (golden share arrangements in British Airport Authority, BAE 
Systems, National Grid Transco, British Energy, Scottish Power, Southern Energy and Rolls 
Royce) and Germany (the Federal Act 21 July 1960 under which the Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft, Woljburg was privatized in 1960). See Johannes Adolff, 'Turn of Tide?: 
The 'Golden Share' Judgments of the European Court of Justice and the Liberalization of the 
European Capital Markets' (2002) 3(8) German Law Journal I; Jeremy Grant and Thomas 
Kirchmaier, 'Corporate Control in Europe' (Winter 2005) 2(2) Corporate Ownership and 
Control 65; BBC, 'BAA 'golden share' ruled illegal' (13 May 2003) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilbusiness/3022809.stm> 26 February 2005. 
Article 46 of Law No 111995 basically allows a company, specified by its article of association 
to have one or more classes of shares (Art 46 (1)) which entitle holders of a particular class of 
shares equal rights (Art 46 (2)). In cases where a company has more than one classification of 
shares, one of such classifications should be of ordinary shares (Art 46 (3)). Article 46 (4) 
specifies other classes of shares which might (i) give the shareholders special voting rights, (ii) 
be in the forms of revocable and/or convertible shares, (iii) give the holders cumulative or non-
cumulative dividends, and which (iv) give the holders preferential rights to dividends and 
company's assets in the event of dissolution. 
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the GOI in Telkom is reinforced by its holding the non-transferable Dwiwarna 
share which has special voting and veto rights over elections and removals of 
executive directors and commissioners and over amendments to the Articles of 
Association, including matters such as company merger and dissolution, increase 
and decrease of authorized capital and decrease of subscribed capital. 106 
There is however several problems associated with the adoption of golden share 
mechanism by the GO I. From internal legal points of view, the existence of golden 
share clauses in Telkom's Articles of Association conflicts with and ruins essential 
pillars of current Indonesian basic company Law No. 111995. At first, such clauses 
are in serious breach of powers and authorities of the Shareholders' Meeting to 
nominate and appoint directors. 107 It is obvious that the powers retained therein the 
golden share are used to nominate and appoint directors who can protect the 
interests of majority shareholder, ie, the GOI. Consequently from an economic 
perspective, golden share arrangements have become unattractive private investors 
because of the bias towards government control. This becomes very harmful as 
international rating agencies generally value the GOI (political) governance as 
'unfavourable'. Golden share arrangements also infringe main principles of GCG, 
namely accountability, independency, transparency, responsibility and fairness. One 
such indication is the nomination and appointment of members of the board of 
commissioners by Series A-Dwiwarna shareholder. Under such a system, it is 
unlikely that the board of commissioners is able to perform its function as the 
company's internal control mechanism. It is also anticipated that golden share 
clauses precipitate several other articles of the basic company law No 1/1995 to 
malfunction. 108 Global practices suggest that the use of golden share mechanism to 
protect the newly privatised SOEs is likely to become increasingly scarce. Several 
current rulings by the European Court of Justice illustrate this tendency and might 
become important precedents worldwide. 109 
It is clear that current Indonesian restructuring programs aim mostly at solving 





Nugraha, above n 47, 224. Compare for example with golden share clauses therein lndosat's 
Articles of Association. Currently owning a 15% equity stake and one 'Series A' special share 
(golden share), the GO! retains its special voting and veto rights over certain strategic matters 
by entering into a Shareholdes' Agreement with ICL, a subsidiary company of Singapore 
Telecom and Telemedia (STT) which is owned by Singapore based Tamasek Holdings 
(Private) Limited. With 'golden' powers similar to those in Telkom, GOI's ability in lndosat is 
limited to elect and remove the Board of Commissioners and Directors by appointing two 
nominees for each governing body. Should GO! reduce its ownership below a certain number 
of shares while remain as the holder of the golden share, its power is reduced to nominating 
one Commissioner and one Director. See Indosat above n 52. 
Article 80 (I) of Law No 1/1995. 
This includes for example Article 54(2) of Law No 111995 which stipulates protection 
mechanisms for minority shareholders who can sue the company in cases where decisions of 
the AGSM, Directors or Commissioners are detrimental to their interests. In consequence to 
the operations of the golden share clauses, a minority shareholder might not be able to sue 
where a 'golden veto' has prevented amendments to the Company's constitution to take place. 
Christine O'Grady Putek, 'Limited but not Lost: A Comment on the ECJ's Golden Share 
Decision' (2004) Fordham Law Review 2219,2219-2283. 
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related to poor governance, the international financial institutions, led by the IMF 
and ADB have focused on market liberalisation through privatisation. However, for 
market forces to function properly, good governance is crucial. 110 
As discussed earlier, Indonesia has quite an extensive coverage of supporting legal 
and regulatory framework to enable telecommunications sector reform to function 
properly. This however is not supported by strong enforcement mechanisms, and 
most basically legal culture. 111 Even though legal and regulatory reform has been 
backed up with some improvements in the legal system such as the establishment of 
a commercial court, appointment of ad hoc judges and appointment of new judges 
to the Supreme Court, judicial corruption represents a significant impediment for 
successful reform. Indonesia would continue to suffer from woefully poor legal 
enforcement, mostly related to corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Thus 
unless a culture which outlaws KKN exists, whatsoever good reform plans will gain 
little benefits. 
Good corporate governance (GCG) is vital for ensuring corporate sustainability and 
accountability. Major telecommunications operators as part of the requirements 
have put this into practice. 112 In addition, since 1997 Indonesia has also put in place 
corporate governance-related reforms by establishing a National Code of Corporate 
Governance in the form of a Decree of the Minister of SOE. 113 Telkom's annual 
reports does, to a certain extent, illustrate its attempts to comply with these 
relatively new standards of GCG. Whilst questions over 'form versus substance' are 
lingering, Telkom got the apparatus of GCG in place. 114 
Establishment of the nomination and remuneration committee is however 
superfluous as any decision it makes with regards to nomination and remuneration 
of the company's executives is subject to approval and rectification by the 
shareholder of Series A Dwiwarna. In addition, key personnel in the company's 
GCG institutions are generally those in the inner circle of politically powerful. 






For a discussion on the trilogy of governance, the elements and their supporting pillars, see F 
A Alijoyo, 'Trilogy of Governance' (2004) Republika (Jakarta). Similar approach has also 
been taken by Inada who uses the concept of governance to complement the limitations of neo-
classical economics which neglecting non-economic factors in its developmental studies. Thus 
in his study about Indonesia, the concept of governance is used to explain important non-
economic factors such as institution, public sector management, political process and the role 
of civil society. See Juichi lnada 'Governance Factors in Indonesian Economic Development' 
in Yasutami Shimomura (ed), The Role ofGovernence in Asia (2003) 137, 137-138. 
The absence of supportive legal culture has been indicated as the culprit of Indonesian 
governance system. For further details see Benny Tabalujan, 'Why Indonesia Corporate 
Governance Failed' (2002) 15(2) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 141, 162. 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) Regulation No I-A. In addition, the JSX has also been 
instituting the 'annual report award' program to support better corporate governance practices. 
Decree No 117/2002 of the Minister for SOEs. 
For establishment, objectives, duties, responsibilities and authorities of each committee, see 
Telkom's 2002 and 2003 Annual Reports. 
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for SOEs which again leaves independency of the board of commissioners with a 
big question mark. 115 
The establishment of Indonesian information and communications society 
(MASTEL) is however a good start for civil society empowerment. Other 
telecommunications industry associations also open up sufficient room for public 
contribution towards the industry's overall improvements. And together, these 
groups represent opportunities for self regulating the industry through soft-law 
arrangements to complement the government's relatively weak legal and regulatory 
enforcements due to excessive red-tape bureaucracy and rooted problems of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. At this stage, privatisation of 
telecommunications has been partial and there is no certainty that full privatisation 
is on the government's agenda. 116 
IV TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REFORMS IN CHINA 
A Initial Stage of Modernisation: Unmaking a Legal Monopoly 
Telecommunications industry in China commenced in 1870 with the construction of 
the first submarine cable by a British company and in 1879 when the Chinese army 
laid the first landline. Since then, services in telegraphs, telephones and wireless 
communications were gradually introduced into China and much of the controls 
were held in Foreign Service providers. 117 After Communist party took over power 
in 1949, the party has kept a tight control on the construction and operation of the 
telecommunications in China. 118 The sector was consolidated under a single 
authority and two operators - the PRC Ministry of Post and Telecom (MPT) and 
Provincial Posts & Telecoms Bureaus (PPT). 119 Apart from certain 
telecommunications infrastructures operations delegated to the Ministry of 
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and PPTs enjoyed exclusive powers to plan, construct, operate and regulate the 
country's public networks. 120 
With near absolute control the temptation to be complacent and gradually sluggish 
is conceivable. MPT's substandard performance has undermined the industry for 
many years. During 1970s and 1980s, MPT was able to vast a considerable amount 
of subsidies and protections from the central Beijing government. In addition, was 
given a free reign to retain high proportion of profits generated, which led to 
diverging outcomes. On one hand, the telecommunications infrastructure enjoyed a 
substantial progress to amass the latest technologies in the world. On the other 
hand, the subscribers to the services were charged by outrageously high prices and 
yet receiving poor quality services. 121 
Similar to Indonesia, China has low teledensity in its initial stages of development. 
In the early days after the establishment ofthe People's Republic of China, the total 
capacity of the switching system was just over 310 thousand lines with 208,750 
telephone subscribers. The telephone density was only 0.05 percent. 122 From 1949 
to 1977, telecommunications developed gradually because telecommunications was 
not a priority in the overall developing process. By the end of 1977, the telephone 
density was only 0.36 percent, increasing less than 0.02 percent every year. 123 
Since 1978 the Chinese government has been performing an interesting balancing 
act. On the one hand, embracing economic development by acquiring information 
technology and attracting foreign investment to improve efficiency and stimulate 
economic growth. On the other hand, wanting to retain the traditional levers of 
control over national industrial policy and maintaining a monopoly structure in 
many key sectors including telecommunications. It reflects Chinese government's 
fear that a complete liberalisation will erode their powers. 124 Even with the '4 
modernization process' 125 in place, they took a 'wait and watch' approach that 
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Nevertheless, the process of re/de regulation in Telecommunications came about in 
1990s pressured by international trends as well as domestic factors. 126 
B Recent Developments: A Very Chinese Affair 
In a single party regime, policy-making has always been a sensitive issue amongst 
various stakeholders in China. Any minor change to the existing practices would 
take months or years to actualise. Moreover, no problems in telecommunications 
can be dealt with in isolation by considering the nature of this industry, which 
therefore drags the policy making process even longer. 127 The State Council after 
years of hesitation and behind the scenes negotiation acknowledge the importance 
of the information age and the needs for efficient flow of information to exist for 
economic reforms to succeed. 128 
Another motivation for telecommunications reforms was the realisation of this as a 
lucrative business. This is the same reason that makes reforms difficult as various 
stakeholders would literally 'wage war' amongst themselves for a share of the profit 
stream. 129 Thus, lengthy bargaining plagues the development of the regulatory 
regime in Chinese telecommunications. The negotiated outcome resulted in the 
introduction of limited competition dominated by a small number of players. 130 
Observers haled this process as 'turf warfare'. 131 
As part of the socialist market economy plan, the Directorate-General of 
Telecommunications (DGT) was separated from the postal operations of the MPT's 
business and corporatised to become a self-financing operator- China Telecom in 
1995. The aim was to establish MPT as an independent regulator. However, the 
new management in China Telecom had strong personal connections with MPT 
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enjoyed certain policy privileges. In particular, China Telecom seemed immune 
from public dissatisfaction. 133 
However this domination attracted many potential challenges. Other ministries 
started to look for their ways to get a 'slice of the cake'. Finally in 1993, China 
Teleom's legal monopoly was curtailed and the State Council approved another 
market entry, the JiTong Communications Company (JiTong), to roll out its own 
data communications network in competition with China Telecom. 134 The Ministry 
of Electronics Industry (MEl) was the principal patron of the new venture. 135 The 
relationship between JiTong and MEl was similar to the relationship between China 
Telecom and MPT. In the meantime, the MPT remained the agency responsible for 
the development and enforcement of regulatory policy. 
A second carrier rivalling MPT was launched after intense political bargaining, 
China Unicorn opened in 19 July 1994. 136 Again MEl and the Ministries of 
Railways and Energy were the sponsors of China Unicorn. Another interesting twist 
is that JiTong was one of the original shareholders in China Unicorn. 137 Their 
involvement was politically determined, and their level of participation operational 
issues was often minimal. In addition, each stakeholder was driven by his or her 
own agendas. 138 To complicate matters, other ministries were getting involved, such 
as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who is equally an important player in this 
political arrangement. In a move to divert the threat from new competitors, the MPT 
entered into a joint venture with the PLA to build and operate COMA cellular 
networks. 139 
Since MPT embraced both regulatory and operational responsibility, Unicorn as an 
entity outside the MPT seem to encounter many problems with China Telecom. In 
fact, Unicorn faced the same problems all new entrants face against China Telecom. 
There were no agreed terms for revenue-share or universal service obligation. 
Unicorn lacked vital resources to develop and was therefore more inclined to look 
for overseas technical partners and finance, reason enough for the MPT to oppose 
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C The 1998 Shakeup: Mil and the New Market Topography 
Political lobbies led by MEl, MOR, MEP, China International Trade and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC) and other interests groups had brought the most 
significant reform to the telecommunications sector in 1998. 
In March 1998, whilst reforming the Chinese bureaucracy, MEl and MPT were 
merged with State Radio Regulation Commission to form a new ministry - Ministry 
of Information Industry (Mil). Mil was to be the principal regulator of the 
Telecommunications and information industry. 141 This reform was designed to set 
up an independent regulator. Its mandate was to introduce more competition, 142 and 
is responsible for policy recommendations, regulation of fixed, mobile, satellite and 
electronic telecom networks and manufacturing; overall planning including radio 
and TV broadcasting and cable TV networks. 143 The leadership of the Mil included 
Wu Jichuan, the minister, 144 five vice ministers; two of which are former MPT vice 
ministers and three were former MEl vice ministers. Wu Jichuan's appointment 
along with two other vice ministers was significant as this suggests that the former 
MPT's influence would continue in this sector. 
Yet after 1998 restructure, the battle for domination in the telecommunications 
sector persisted. During 1999-2000, the newly established Mil led the market 
through a complicated restructuring program to accommodate competing interests 
groups. As a compromise, ministries' negotiation brought about new 
telecommunications topography with a total of seven SOEs in 2000, breaking up 
China Telecom's four divisions of services into separate entities. Consequently, 
four independent companies were formed. They are responsible for the fixed line, 
mobile, paging and satellite communication services, respectively. The fixed line 
services maintained the name China Telecom. The new China Telecom was 
officially incorporated on 17 May 2000. 145 The mobile service department of the old 
China Telecom became China Mobile, 146 which was established on 16 May 2000. A 
new company, China Satellite, 147 which would provide satellite telecommunications 
services, was also approved by the State Council. The paging arm of the old China 
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new China Telecom, China Mobile and Unicorn were compatible with each other in 
size and hence more equal rivalries were established. 148 
The diagram below provides a clear description of this 1998 game both from the 




1998 Reform - new arrangement for services 149 
Fixed line j- .,_ China Telecom, Unicorn and some local cable TV networks 
Mobile China Mobile, Unicorn, Great Wall and potential entrants (China Satellite 
.. China Telecom) 
IP 
telephony t-• Unicorn, China Telecom, Netcom, Jitong and China Mobile 
Paging II>- Unicorn and many other providers 
Data .. China Telecom, Unicorn, Netcom, Jitong, China Mobile and potential entrants 
(e.g. the cable TV networks) 
1998 Reform - new arrangement for players 150 
~ China Telecom - still holds an absolute majority market share in fixed-
/ line phone market 
/ China Mobile - operate in mobile phone market, with an initial market 
Old China I t - .,. share of 50% in mobile market. 
Telecom \' 
..... China Satellite - operate satellite business, which was originally owned \ by China Telecom \ 
\ China Netcom- build and operate a broadband data transmission 
network and to provide Internet services. 
China Was strengthened by obtaining mobile's paging business and permitted 
Unicorn 
__ .,. 
to maintain its 25% market share in mobile telephony as well as roll out 




China _d The second-largest fixed network provider by transferring to it a 
Railcom -
_.,. 
telephony network established by the Chinese Ministry of Railways 
along China's rail networks. 
Wu, above n 120, 22 
Source: information obtained from <http://www.chinatelecom.eom.cn/cn>, <http://www. 
chinamobile.com/Chinese/Chinese.htm>, <http://www.chinaunicom.com.cn>, and 
<http://www.cnc.net.cn/english/indexe 1 024.html> 14 June 2002. 
Ibid. 
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D The 2002 Reform: Privatisation or Capital Rising Exercise? 
Despite the 1998 restructuring, the battle for domination in the telecommunications 
sector persisted. After 2 years reallocating market share between the various 
providers· the changes was still far from completing. In May 2002, to increase 
competition, the Chinese State Council created six multi-functional state-owned 
enterprises with a high degree of functional overlap. 151 The market topography was 
reorganised again to reflect the socialist market economy policies. It was not 
surprising that a lengthy bargaining process once again constituted the new 
outcome. The diagram below details the new arrangements. 
2002 Reform- mix up the functions of the players 152 
China telecom, Northern (part of China Netcom)- permitted to operate 
China <~ a mobile telephony and fixed line, operates with China Netcom Teleco 
-
China telecom, Southern- new China Telecom: permitted to operate a 
mobile telephony and tixed line 
China 
Mobile 
_, j Unchanged as China's largest operator in the mobile services market. 
China 
Satellite """' Expanding services into other markets 
China .j- China Telecom North +China Net com+ Jitong 
Netcom 
Unchanged and can provide a full range of telecommunicationss 
China F- _, ... services with a focus on mobile telephony 
Unicorn 
Unchanged and can provide a full range of telecommunicationss 
China 
Railcom 
to-- ... services with a focus on fixed-line telephony 
In addition, the State Council is likely to partially or fully privatise some of these 
state-owned enterprises to raise funds for further infrastructure investment. 153 
To date, a number of Hong Kong subsidiaries of these enterprises have already been 
privatised to raise capital for infrastructure investment. 154 Interestingly, China 
Unicorn managed to launch IPOs at New York Stock Exchange and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange back in June 2000 to raise foreign capital; whereas for domestic 
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Shanghai Stock Exchange. 155 Comparatively, the privatisation of the incumbent-
China Telecom happened much later. After completion of its corporate restructuring 
in 2002, China Telecom finally issued its shares globally by listing its H shares on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in November 2002 while the ADS were listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange in November 2002. 156 
Since 2002 reform, the Chinese telecommunications services have seven providers 
including Internet and other value-added service businesses and thus competition in 
this sector has emerged. 
Moreover, another decision was made in 2002 to mix up the respective functions of 
those seven existing market players. The purpose of this decision was to promote 
more effective market given a wider range of competitive overlap. 157 While 
Indonesia was still struggling to establish a competitive market for network and 
service providers in 2002, by this time Chinese competitive domestic market had 
been developing. 
E The Invisible Hand: The Inter-Ministries Tug-of-Market Share 
As argued, the regulatory development in Chinese Telecommunications industry 
has gone through several different stages coupled with various reforms. Chinese 
policy making is driven by a number of different, and at times, contradictory 
concerns. Policy considerations include Chinese national security, coordinated 
regional development, and the promotion of competitive domestic industry. More 
importantly, inter-ministries negotiation is critical to policy making. Different 
objectives of each government ministries and interest groups have resulted in the 
creation of multiple state-owned enterprises. The increase in number does not 
necessarily lead to a better competitive market. 
Allegations have historically been made against the certain Chinese Ministries 
favouring a particular state-owned enterprise under their control to dominate this 
sector. For example, in pre-Mil period, both JiTong and China Unicorn complained 
that MPT was unfairly promoting the interests of China Telecom, particularly in 
relation to Telecommunications interconnection disputes. Complaints against Mil 
from unwarranted interference and continued favourable protection of a particular 
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F Legal Framework: A Lack of Regulation or Regulatory Will? 
Ambiguous legal environment have contributed to the above outcomes. Foremost is 
that there has never been an overarching and coherent telecommunications law 
enacted to regulate the industry. Various administrative decisions from the State 
Council shape the changes on an ad hoc basis in conjunction with a handful of 
confusing regulations such as Telecommunications Regulations 2000, which in 
nature, is still a set of administrative regulations issued by the State Council. 159 
However, the pitfalls had become apparent over the past several years. For example, 
there are clear failures to address the problems concerning interconnection charges 
and convergence issues. 
In reality China began formulating a broad ranging of Telecommunications law for 
the last 24 years. 160 Part of the reasons contributing to the lengthy process is due to 
the fastest-growing nature of this sector, but also the multifaceted and hard-to-
balance powerful competing interests. 161 For instance, Mil and the SARFT have 
been at odds over who should have jurisdiction to regulate the telecommunications 
and broadcasting cable operators. 162 This resulted in a significant over-regulation of 
broadband cable sector and uneconomical infrastructure duplication. 163 
According to the previously agreed timetable in 1995, the State Council promised to 
introduce a Telecommunications Law to guide the future development of the 
industry, 164 but reasons for 'shelfing' such legislation has never been evident. 165 
According to Chinese media reports, a draft Telecommunications Law of the 
People's Republic of China (Telecoms Law) has been completed. Recent attempts 
by Mil to sought feedback from relevant government departments, organisations, 
enterprises and experts in this sector is encouraging and is apparently now ready to 
submit the draft to the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council. It is expected that 
the draft Telecoms Law could be ready for implementation after it passes the 
National People's Congress sometime next year. Even after promulgation, it is 
uncertain when the new legislation will become fully effective. 166 
As the market continues to grow and following the country's WTO accession in 
2001, China is now facing a number of crucial challenges with its telecom industry. 









The Telecommunications Ordinance of the People's Republic of China was promulgated by 
the State Council on September 20, 2000, and came into force on the same day. 
China's Long-expected Telecoms Law in Consolidation Stage', China Daily, 3 September 
2004. 
Ibid. 
Jeanette Chan, Moreia Ellis and Anthony Zhao, 'Cable TV - What Do the New Procedures 
Offer' (2000) 2 China Law and Practice 45. 
China Netcom was created from a policy proposal to build a high-bandwidth Internet network. 
After approval by the Chinese Government, the company was formed by the China Academy 
of Sciences, SARFT, the Ministry of Railways and the Government of Shanghai· 
US-China Bilateral WTO agreement 
'China's Telecom Act is on the way', China Daily. 7 March 2005, Xinhua net, Beijing. 
Ibid. 
HeinOnline -- 2 Macquarie J. Bus. L. 164 2005
164 MqJBL (2005) Vo/2 
As part of culture, doing things in China depends on connections or personal 
networks at a great deal. This is more definite in running a lucrative business like 
Telecommunications. Given the close relations between the Mil and the state-
owned Chinese telecom companies, the Mil is far from being a truly independent 
telecom regulator. This presents an important challenge of a regulator to address 
matters including inter-connection, allocation of resources, controlling 
transparency, fairness and regulating unfair competition. 167 
Chinese authorities believe in 'win-win scenarios' while western world believes in 
'zero-sum game'. David Lampton pointed out with respect to China: 
A bargaining perspective does not mean that China is on the road to free enterprise -
indeed, bargaining can be one means by which established hierarchies endeavor to 
prevent the further erosion of their power, a way to avoid the increased use of market 
forces. Moreover, bargaining does not mean that established hierarchies are being 
dismantled; on the contrary, bargaining is one reflection of the fact that there are 
large, competitive bureaucracies and territorial administrations that are absolutely 
central to the functioning of both society and the polity. Bargaining does not 
necessarily result in more coherent policies or more efficient governance. Bargaining 
is more akin to protracted guerrilla warfare within and between large scale 
organisations. 168 
Thus, the entry of an increasing number of players into telecoms market certainly 
intensified and extended competition. But increasing competition only means a 
more competitive market but also means a more matters concerning formulating 
regulation and the relationships between regulator and regulatee becomes more 
complicated. 
Decentralisation of management - horizontally or vertically - does not necessarily 
lead to deregulation, nor does it necessarily mean a waning of national leadership. 
Indeed, decentralisation appears to have made the administration more effective at 
achieving its objectives, not less. Opening up for competition in network equipment 
supplies, mobile communications and value-added services does not of itself 
indicate a change in the long held political and ideological notion that 
Telecommunications perform a critical role. Thus it would be a mistake to assume 
that the leadership's decision to reform this sector would lead down to the path of 
liberalisation, deregulation and full privatisation. 
G WTO Membership: Privileges or Interference? 
China's entry into WTO in late 2001 adds to further contradictions to the Socialist 
economic ideology. The entry to WTO means a new regulatory regime has to be 
167 
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established and foreign operators must be gradually allowed access into Chinese 
market. 169 Against this background, a paradox of 'being Chinese' and participating 
in the global economy created certain tensions between expectations and reality, 
especially when China made many commitments in telecommunications sector to 
meet WTO requirements. 170 Thus China is obliged to continue its reform under this 
Treaty to split the regulatory and operating functions of Mil and adopt pro-
competitive regulatory principles, which are necessary for foreign-investors to 
compete with local players. 
Four Sino-foreign joint ventures were approved in 2003, all of which provide 
Internet access services. 171 And in accordance with China's WTO commitments, 
since 11 December 2004, foreign-funded enterprises have been allowed to establish 
joint-venture telecom companies and a maximum 25 percent shareholding in 
domestic and international fundamental telecom services. This entry of foreign 
capital into Chinese telecom market will bring both diversity and practical service 
to its domestic users. It is fair to say that, to certain extend, the problem that foreign 
telecommunications service providers have faced in accessing China's market has 
improved in the post-WTO period. However, some major challenges still remain 
unsolved, which include more market access, a better legal and regulatory 
environment with higher international standards and greater transparency. 
Moreover, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade must be removed; foreign exchange 
control must be relaxed; issues of intellectual property rights, subsidies and product 
safeguards must be adequately addressed; and current Chinese demand on foreign 
companies to export products and provide technology transfer in return for market 
access must be eliminated. 
Even if the WTO might offer China a 'grace period' for the protection of the 
country's fledgling industries, several economic sectors are bound to suffer from 
fierce international competition. Like all other countries, China is concerned about 
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weakened government control of China's key industries, large-scale structural 
unemployment, and social dislocation that may result from foreign competition. 
Therefore, 'How will China introduce and implement WTO rules?' Answer to this 
question is a cause for speculation as it is most likely that introduction and 
implementation will be done in 'Chinese way'. 172 
V CONCLUSIONS 
This article is not about comparing the experiences of Indonesia and China or 
hypothesizing an Asia-Pacific model of privatisation per se. Much of the expected 
benefits of privatisation assume that by transferring and restructuring SOEs from 
government ownership and administration into private ownership and corporate 
management, subjected to market forces would rid these entities of inefficiencies 
and financial losses. And anecdotal evidence from many fully privatised SOEs 
around the world seems to support these economic propositions delivering greater 
efficiency and profitability. 
International institutions like the World Bank has produced guidelines and offered 
many recommendations as to how developing countries should go about privatising 
SOEs. On the same breath, advocates selective re-regulation to promote and 
maintain competition and introduce self-governing corporate mechanisms. For 
developing nations where capital and technological expertise are scare, conforming 
and adhering to these guidelines is a vital link to tap into international markets and 
capital. 
This is not to say that guidelines are necessarily draconian or dictatorial. These 
documents assist developing countries at two levels. On one level, it provides a 
template or guide for these countries to action upon, otherwise trial-and-error could 
be economical and politically cost as failures tend to generate devastating knock on 
affects on progress. On another level, in keeping with those guidelines, international 
investments would be more inclined to flow into these countries. However 
regulating privatisation is not as clear-cut or uncomplicated as the guidelines had 
anticipated. Economic regulations are not always consistent or manageable by 
authorities. 
Apart from encouraging private sector to participate, separation of state's ownership 
functions with operation matters, implementing competition policies and removing 
legal barriers for new entrants, and establishing an independent regulator. 
Stakeholders have to be willing to comply with any necessary directives including 
bearing some financial cost in the course of restructuring and loss of market share. 
Furthermore, in the post privatisation climate, the notion of effective corporate 
governance and board has to be instituted. Governments would ideally no longer be 
partaking in operational decisions. 
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Common to both Indonesia and China is that they are both developing economies 
seeking international investments to flow in. The level of international investments 
channelling into their economies would invariably be hinged upon the adoption of 
reform agendas and practices proposed by international institutions like the World 
Bank. But both countries face considerable domestic pressured from local 
businesses, institutional and political players. These stakeholders might share both 
common and competing interests, where both governments would unavoidably have 
to play a mediating role. Unless some level of acquiesces could be achieved 
amongst various local stakeholders including shareholders (private or public), 
instigating laws and regulations might serve nothing more a 'paper chase' because 
of its unenforceability. 
Whilst both governments appear to be committed (in various degrees) to complying 
with international guidelines and standards, each has adapted those 
recommendations to suit domestic realities and political agendas. Indonesia has 
undergone economic liberalisation for some decades; aside from accusations of 
corruption appear to have the necessary regulation for privatisation of the 
Telecommunications sector in place. The government's determination in leaching 
onto the 'golden shares' could quash any realistic expectation complete 
privatisation and implementing a robust corporate governance regime. Nevertheless 
greater competition in mobile, overseas calling services, and broadband have been 
actualised. 
China too, has underwent economic liberalisation, though much later compared to 
Indonesia, until date has yet to put in place the necessary measures and 
comprehensive regulations. Rather the telecommunications sector had been 'carved 
up' into several pieces according to different product categorisation as competing 
government institutions support by various business interests have dominated this 
market. The reluctance or deference of the central Beijing authorities to fully 
privatise is perhaps due to consensus making and collective decision making nature 
of Chinese political leadership, thus privatisation could only be realised with 
distinct Chinese characteristics. 
If there are lessons to be drawn from these two case studies in regulating the 
process of privatising the telecommunications sector is that each developing 
country has a host of domestic considerations to be taken into account. There needs 
to be greater flexibility and diversity. More important the interests of key domestic 
economic and political stakeholders would have to be taken into account. A more 
pragmatic model adapted from international guidelines would be formulated. A 
series of negotiated outcomes with key domestic stakeholders focusing on 
practicable time frame would be preferable. Lastly post privatisation issues like 
corporate governance also needs to be addressed. This issue is a vital aspect of the 
entire Telecommunications reform package to deliver the desirable outcomes, 
which needs to be tackled in future research. 
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